The Effect of Custodial Parents' Sexual Conduct in Dependency Determinations: In re Burrell by Shank, S. Adele
The Effect of Custodial Parents' Sexual Conduct in
Dependency Determinations: In re Burrell
In a dependency action brought under Ohio Revised Code section
2151.04(C),' the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, Juvenile
Division, found two minor children to be dependent because their mother
had permitted a man not her husband to live in her home along with the
two children. It was established at trial that both children were "normal,
healthy, clean and well dressed with no evidence of abuse."2 It was further
established through the testimony of a caseworker from the Franklin
County Children's Services Board that the children suffered no
demonstrable ill effects as a result of their mother's relationship. In
addition, the evidence showed that the children's school attendance was
regular, their dress was appropriate, their grades average or above average,
and that they exhibited no specific behavioral problems.3
At the time of disposition the mother was living alone and so was
granted custody with the caveat that if she did again reside with her "male
companion" the children would be removed from her custody. 4 This
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals of Franklin County on June
27, 1978. 5 On April25, 1979, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court
of appeals and established that where the sexual conduct of a custodial
parent is at issue, there must be presented clear and convincing evidence
that the parent's conduct has an immediate and specifically demonstrable
adverse impact upon the child in order to reach a determination of
dependency.6
Until the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Burrell no definite
standard existed to determine when a custodial parent's sexual conduct
was of such significance that it would result in a determination of
dependency. This lack of an established standard caused extreme
variations in the standards actually applied in such proceedings, generally
permitting the court to base its decision upon its own view of morality.
7
"Dependent child" was originally defined by the Ohio legislature in
General Code section 1645:
1. In re Burrell, 58 Ohio St. 2d 37, 388 N.E.2d 738 (1979). Ot1o REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(C)
(Page 1976) states in part:
["Diependent child" includes any child:
(C) Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests or the
child, in assuming his guardianship.
As a rule, dependency actions are brought under subpart (C) when they are based upon allegations of
parental sexual misconduct.
2. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 37, 388 N.E.2d at 738.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 38, 388 N.E.2d at 738.
5. In re Burrell, No. 77 AP-889 (CL App. Franklin County June 27, 1978).
6. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 39, 388 N.E.2d at 739.
7. The various standards applied are discussed in the text accompanying notes 15-39 infra.
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For the purpose of this chapter, the words "dependent child" shall mean
any child under eighteen years of age who is dependent upon the public for
support; or who is destitute, homeless or abandoned; or who has not proper
parental care or guardianship, or who begs or receives alms; or who is given
away or disposed of in any employment, service, exhibition, occupation or
vocation contrary to any law of the state; or who is found living in a house of
ill fame, or with any vicious or disreputable persons or whose home, by
reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on the part of its parent, step-parent,
guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is an unfit place for such
child; or who is prevented from receiving proper education or proper
physical, mental, medical or surgical examination and treatment because of
the conduct, inability or neglect of its parents, step-parent, guardian or other
person in whose care it may be; or whose condition or environment is such as
to warrant the state, in the interest of the child, in assuming its guardianship.'
While the statute included a lengthy enumeration of actions and/ or con-
ditions that would result in a determination of dependency, it was drafted
so broadly and contained so many vague or undefined terms that it left the
actual meaning of dependency a matter almost entirely within the court's
discretion. In addition, the statute's final clause-"or whose condition or
environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interest of the child, in
assuming its guardianship"-clearly left the door open for the court to
determine dependency in any manner, as long as it served the court's
perception of the child's interests. 9
In a later revision of Ohio's General Code,' 0 "dependent child" was
defined in a more succinct manner. Still included were certain specific
conditions that required a finding of dependency." Although many of the
earlier specifications were dropped, the all-inclusive final clause of General
Code section 1645 was retained. Again the courts were left to their own
8. OHIO GEN. CODE § 1645 (Page 1926).
9. Generally, in a dependency action, the best interests of the child are not to be considered until
after an adjudication of dependency. In re Darst, 117 Ohio App. 374, 378, 192 N.E.2d 287, 290 (1963),
The language of this clause (which is still in effect), however, permits consideration of the child's
interests in determining dependency. This final clause (now subsection (C) of § 2141.04) has been
interpreted as a blanket permissiveness "intended to coverall those situations not otherwise specifically
defined by the neglect or dependency statutes." In re East, 61 Ohio Op. 2d 38, 40,288 N.E.2d 343, 345
(1972). But see In re Konneker, 30 Ohio App. 502,509, 165 N.E. 850,852 (1929), quoting Orrv. State,
70 Ind. App. 242, 123 N.E. 470 (1919):
["Environment"] is a word of broad significance. Just what the Legislature intended by this
last clause we do not know. We assume, however, that it did not intend thereby to confer
unlimited authority on the courts to determine arbitrarily and generally what sort of
environment will justify the state in assuming control of infants ....
The court went on to call for a legislative determination of what environmental conditions determined
dependency.
10. OHIo GEN. CODE § 1639-4 (Page 1951) states:
For the purpose of this chapter, the words "dependent child" includes any child:
1. Who is homeless or destitute or without proper care or support, through no fault of
its parents, guardian or custodian.
2. Who lacks proper care or support by reason of the mental or physical condition ofits
parents, guardian or custodian.
3. Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of
the child, in assuming its guardianship.
I1. All versions of the definition of dependent child have included as a basis for a determination
of dependency the lack of proper care. The current law in Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.05 (Page 1976)
states in part that a child is without proper parental care when he is permitted to become dependent.
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devices and vices to determine what factors required a finding of
dependency and what was in the interest of the child. Thus, a court's
personal bias toward various sexual orientations and activities often
became the standard by which dependency was determined. 2
The Ohio Revised Code adopted the later General Code definition of
"dependent child" in substantially the same form. 3 With only a minorand
short-lived variation 14 the statute remains the same today.
In applying Ohio's dependency statute, Ohio courts in general have
chosen one of three standards for determining the effect of sexual conduct
on the dependency determination.' 5 Those three standards are conclusive
disqualification, presumptive adverse impact, and speculative adverse
impact.1
6
Conclusive disqualification is self-defining. Once the court has
determined that sexual misconduct has occurred, the party who engaged in
such conduct is conclusively disqualified as being unfit to retain custody
and therefore the child is found dependent. In In re Decker,17 the Juvenile
Court of Tuscarawas County found that a child was dependent because its
parents associated with "questionable characters" in circumstances that
"could not possibly continue without leading to estrangement," because
the mother had a venereal disease, and because both parents stayed out late
at places that were "obnoxious to the other" while leaving the child with a
neighbor.'" No evidence was offered regarding the child's health,
12. See text accompanying notes 17-39 infra.
13. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (Page 1976) states:
As used in sections2151.01 to 2151.54, inclusive, of the Revised Code,"dependentchild"
includes any child:
(A) Who is homeless or destitute or without propercare or support, through no fault of
his parents, guardian, or custodian;
(B) Who lacks proper care or support by reason of the mental orphysicalcondition of
his parents, guardian, or custodian;
(C) Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of
the child, in assuming his guardianship.
14. OiIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 included between 1961 and 1969 the following:
(D) Whose parent or parents or legal guardian or custodian have placed or attempted
to place such child in violation of section 5103.16 and 5103.17 of the Revised Code.
H. 320, 133 OHio LAWs 2040 (1969).
15. In many of the cases discussed herein thevarious courts have discussed factors in addition to
the sexual conduct of the parent as contributing to the child's dependency. Unless otherwise noted,
however, those other factors will generally not support a finding of dependency. Thus, in thisNote, the
author assumes that the sexual conduct served as the basis of the finding. This assumption is generally
supported by the opinions. It is further supported by the fact that once the court in any of these cases
determines that a parent's conduct is "immoral," a finding of dependency inevitably follows.
16. Labels for the various standards and their definitions were freely adopted from Lauerman,
Nonnmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 647,654-70 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Lauerman]; see also, generally, Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbidan Mothers: Legal
Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691,693-715 (1976); Bregman, Custody Awards:
Standards Used When the Mother Has Been Guilty of Adultery or Alcoholism, 2 FAmI. L.Q. 384,387
(1968); Foster & Freed, Child Custody (Part I), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423, 429-31 (1964).
17. 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 433 (1913). This is the only case discussed in the text ofthis Note in which
temporary placement was ordered. All others resulted in permanent termination of parental rights.
18. Id. at 434-35. As with many early cases, the court's delicacy leaves much to assumption what
actual conduct took place. The implication ofsexual misconduct is clear, although no specific instances
are cited.
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cleanliness, emotional well-being, or his actual living conditions.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the neighbor with whom the child
was left was in any way unfit to care for the child under such temporary
arrangements. Once the conduct had been established, the court assumed
that, by virture of their engaging in such conduct, the parents were unfit.
Further evidence that the court's determination of'unfitness was based
upon the parents' conduct and not upon the condition of the child is the
court's remark that if the parents had agreed to give up their way of life and
live together "as a father and mother should" raising the child "according
to the Christian standard" the court would have placed the child back into
their custody.' 9
In State v. Griffin,20 a prosecution for contributing to the dependency
or neglect of a child,2t the court held that the mere testimony by the child's
mother that she had engaged in "illicit sexual relations" in the presence of
the child 22 was sufficient to establish that the child was neglected or
dependent. The same evidence had served as the basis for a determination
that the child was both dependent and neglected in an earlier proceeding."3
No evidence was presented regarding the physical or emotional well-being
of the child or of the quality of care the child was given by its mother. As in
Decker, the conduct of the custodial parent established her as unfit.
The Common Pleas Court of Stark County in In re Turner24 found a
child who had never been in his mother's custody to be dependent.
Although the court claimed to have based its decision on several factors
besides the mother's sexual conduct, including a psychologist's report
stating that the mother had a "poor prognosis for success in the role of
wife and mother,, 21 it is clear throughout the opinion that the court's main
concern was the mother's past sexual conduct. The court's finding was
made in the absence of any "derogatory testimony" concerning the
physical surroundings of the mother's home and with the knowledge that
the child's mother had adequate food, clothing, and shelter.26 It is apparent
that the court's determination was based on the mother's past sexual
conduct and on a psychologist's report indicating that such conduct might
continue. No other evidence was offered that would normally result in a
determination of dependency. The child's mother was conclusively
disqualified from obtaining custody because of her sexual conduct.
Presumptive adverse impact is similar to the conclusive presumption
19. Id. at 435.
20. 93 Ohio App. 299, 106 N.E.2d 668 (1952).
21. See Orffo GEN. CODE 1639-45 (Page 1951).
22. There is no explanation whether "in the presence of the child" means that child was asleep in
the same room, or present in the same house, or actually observing the sexual activity with or without
the mother's knowledge.
23. 93 Ohio App. at 303, 106 N.E.2d at 670.
24. 41 Ohio Op. 2d 264, 229 N.E,2d 764, 231 N.E.2d 502 (1967).
25. Id. at 267, 229 N.E.2d at 768, 231 N.E.2d at 505.
26. Id. at 266, 229 N.E.2d at 766, 231 N.E.2d at 504.
27. Id. at 267, 229 N.E.2d at 767-68, 231 N.E.2d at 505.
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approach, except that the court presumes, once the conduct has been
established, that the conduct results in an adverse impact. This pre-
sumption is generally unexplained although phrased in terms of the child's
welfare.28 In In re East,29 the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Divi-
sion, of Highland County, found the child dependent, but specifically
rejected a determination of a mother's unfitness "predicted from her past
history."3° Rather, the court found that the child's prospective environ-
ment demanded a determination of dependency. The court, finding that
the sixteen-year-old unwed mother had been an incorrigible and sexually
promiscuous child with no visible means of support,31 stated that "[t]he
law does not require the court to experiment with the child's welfare to see
if he will suffer great detriment or harm. 32 The court assumed an adverse
impact would result based upon the mother's sexual conduct, even though
the child had never been in her custody.
The third standard used by Ohio courts is speculative adverse impact.
It is based on the court's opinion that an adverse impact may be occurring
in the present or may occur in the future due to parental sexual conduct.
This standard differs from presumptive adverse impact only in that, rather
than assuming that sexual conduct equals adverse impact, the court
generally acknowledges that the speculative impact is based on probability
and will indicate specifically what harmful impact is expected.33 The
Juvenile Court of Huron County in In re Douglas,34 after establishing that
both parents were guilty of "serious marital misconduct,"" found two
children dependent, stating that "[i]t is almost certain, it is unquestionably
highly probable, that if these little children are left with their families, by
the time they reach adolescence, the courts will have to deal with them as
delinquents: as adults they will have no better habits or morals than their
parents. ... . Later, that same court in In re Dake ' found dependent
the children of a woman who, according to the court, was "so devoid of
morals and intelligence as to bring forth a series of illegitimate children
who must be supported by public funds. . ... ,38 The impact predicted by
the court was that the children were left in such an atmosphere of moral
28. Lauerman, supra note 16, at 667-68.
29. 61 Ohio Op. 2d 38, 288 N.E.2d 343 (1972).
30. Id. at 41, 288 N.E.2d at 346. The court also found that a determination of unfitness is not
necessary for a child to be dependent. Id. at 40, 288 N.E.2d at 345.
31. Normally the fact that a parent was an incorrigible child will not support a finding of
dependency. Also the fact that there was no visible means ofsupport is inconclusive since thechild was
removed from the mother's custody when it was two days old and there was no evidence presented that
the mother was unwilling or unable to work. "Visibility" of means ofsupport is irrelevant in any event.
Section 2151.04 (A) and (B) calls for an actual lack of support, not a possibility in the future.
32. Id. at 41, 288 N.E.2d at 346.
33. Lauerman, supra note 16, at 663-66.
34. 82 Ohio L. Abs. 170, 164 N.E.2d 475 (1959).
35. Id. at 174, 164 N.E.2d at 478.
36. Id. at 176, 164 N.E.2d at 480.
37. 87 Ohio L. Abs. 483, 180 N.E.2d 646 (1961).
38. Id. at 485, 180 N.E.2d at 648.
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indecency, stigmatized by their illegitimacy, that they would grow up to
produce more illegitimate children who would become wards of the state.39
Clearly, Ohio courts have played a game of pick-and-choose in
finding standards to determine the effect a parent's sexual conduct on a
dependency determination. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Burrell,
however, has ended the arbitrary application of varying standards in such
cases. That decision establishes a present adverse impact standard to
measure the effect of a custodial parent's sexual conduct in a determination
of dependency.40 This new standard, which overrules the use of the three
standards discussed above, requires a four step analysis. First, the sexual
conduct must be established. Second, it must be established that the
conduct forms a part of the child's environment. Third, it must be shown
that the conduct has an impact upon the child. Finally, it must be
"specifically demonstrated" by clear and convincing evidence4t that the
impact upon the child is adverse to an extent that warrants state
intervention.
Burrell does not preclude the consideration of sexual conduct in
determining dependency. It does preclude such a determination unless
each of the four elements of the new present adverse impact standard are
met. Generally, isolated incidents of sexual conduct will not be sufficient
to establish dependency because such incidents could not be considered a
part of the child's environment. Clearly, the new standard precludes
determination of dependency based upon sexual conduct that occurs
outside the home,42 without the child's knowledge,43 or prior to the child's
birth, because such activity is beyond the child's environment."
The fact that a parent may be perceived by the court as immoral due to
sexual conduct or activity will no longer be sufficient to find a child
dependent. The "morality" of the parent is no longer a significant factor.
Only actual conduct that has an adverse impact and is part of the child's
environment is relevant in dependency proceedings. The new standard in
Burrell relieves the Ohio courts of the onerous burden of labeling sexual
conduct in terms of its moral character.
Although Burrell deals particularly with the situation of a woman
living with a man not her husband, the court clearly extended this decision
to include all other nonmarital relationships including those between
members of the same sex. Discussing Ohio Revised Code section 2151.04
39. Id. at 486, 489, 180 N.E.2d at 649, 651.
40. See note 16 supra.
41. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page 1976): "If the court finds from clear and convincing
evidence that the child is a. . . dependent child .. "
42. In re Decker, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 433 (1913).
43. Adverse impact could occur although the child had no knowledge of the sexual activity if the
child were neglected due to the activity or submitted to social ridicule due to others' knowledge of the
activity; in general, however, lack of knowledge would preclude a finding of dependency, Lauerman,
supra note 16, at 675 n.174.
44. In re Turner, 41 Ohio Op. 2d 264, 229 N.E.2d 764, 231 N.E.2d 502 (1967).
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(C),45 the court held that "[t]he conduct of a parent is relevant under the
terms of this specific section solely insofar as that parent's conduct forms a
part of the environment of this child.""
The standard established in Burrell alleviates many of the problems
exhibited in earlier decisions. The present adverse impact standard
changes dependency determinations in which parental sexual conduct is in
issue from situations in which the subjective morality of individual judges
determined the outcome, to proceedings in which determinations must be
based on objective evidence. 47 The time has passed when a court could in
good faith accept a determination that a child could be permanently
separated from his parent simply because of ajudicial or societal prejudice
against particular lifestyles or sexual orientations.4" The Burrell decision is• 49
a much needed advance in ending such arbitrary decisionmaking.
S. Adele Shank
45. See note I supra.
46. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 39, 388 N.E.2d at 739.
47. The court's only criterion for the evidence is that it specifically demonstrates in a clear and
convincing manner the adverse impact. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 39,388 N.E.2d at739. It is clear, however, that
even if it is established that a child is exhibiting emotional or behavioral problems, it must still be
shown that there is a nexus between the child's problem and the parent's sexual conduct. Fora general
discussion, see Lauerman, supra note 16, at 672-81.
48. Burrell may still, however, leave too much to judicial discretion since it fails to develop a
standard for determining when an impact is adverse.
49. The decision in Brrell should also be a step toward alleviating similar problems in custody
proceedings. Although the final analysis in dependency and custody proceedings is very different-
dependency possibly resulting in the permanent termination of parental rights while custody usually
changing only living arrangements--each type of action when initiated because of parental sexual
conduct should be subject to the same analysis in determining the effect of such conduct. Each type of
proceeding requires the court to act in the interests ofthe child. Therefore, in a custody proceeding,just
as in a dependency proceeding, it must be established that the parent's sexual conduct is having an
adverse impact. Without a showing of harm it cannot be in the best interests ofthe child to remove him
from what is otherwise an adequate custody situation, i.e., if parental sexual conduct is irrelevant in a
dependency proceeding, unless there is a showing of adverse impact, it is irrelevant in a custody
proceeding without a similar finding.

